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NTERNATIONAL Banking Facilities IBFs) started
operation in the United States in early December1981.
Since then, they have grown to the point where they
now represent a significant part of the international
banking business worldwide. ‘Fhe purpose of this arti-
cle is to examine lBFs and to discuss their significance
for international banking.
OFFSHORE BANKING
A substantial “offshore” international banking sec-
tor,often called the “eurocurreney” market, grewup in
the 1960s and 1970s. Its key characteristic is that bank-
ing business is transacted in a location outside the
countiy in whose currency the business is denomi-
nated. Thus, eurodollar transactions are conducted
outside the United States, eurosterling transactions are
conducted outside Britain. and so on. Much of this
offshorebusiness occurs in major financial centers like
London, though some business is literally in islands
offshore from the United States, such as the Bahamas
or Cayman Islands.
Offshore banking business is somewhat different
from that conducted onshore. Though, in both cases,
banks take deposits and make loans, offshore banks
have virtually no checking deposit liabilities. Instead,
their deposits are typically made forspecificperiods of
time, yield interest, and are generally in large denom-
inations.
Offshore banking arose as ameans to avoid avariety
of banking regulations. For example, offshore banks
that deal in eurodollars avoid reserve requirements on
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deposits, FDIC assessments and U.S-imposed interest
rate ceilings. The first two of these regulations increase
the margin between deposit and loan rates. Avoiding
these costs enables offshore banks to operate on much
smaller margins. tnterest ceilings, where binding, re-
duce the ability of banks subject to such ceilings to
compete internationally for deposits.
Many ‘shell” bank branches in offshore centers,
such as the Caymans and Bahamas, exist almost solely
to avoid U.S. banking regulations. Shell branches are
offices that have little more than a name plate and a
telephone. Theyareused simpls’ as addresses forbook-
ing transactions set up by U.S. banks, which thereby
avoid domestic monetary regulations.
IBFs: ONSHORE OFFSHORE BANKS
IBFs do notrepresent newphysical banking facilities;
instead, they are separate sets of books within existing
banking institutions— a U.S-chartered depositojy in-
stitution, a U.S. branch or agency ofaforeign bank, ora
U.S. office of an Edge Act corporation.1 They can only
take deposits from and make loans to nonresidents of
the United States, other lBFs and their establishing
entities. Moreover, lBFs are not subject to the regula-
tions that apply to domestic banking activity; they
avoid reserve requirements, interest rate ceilings and
deposit insurance assessment. In effect, they are
accorded the advantages of many offshore banking
centers without the need to be physically offshore.
‘Asa result ofa 1919 amendmenttothe Federal ReserveAct initiated
by Sen. Walter Edge, U.S. banks are able to establish branches
outside their home state. These branches mustbe involved only in
business abroad or the finance of foreign trade. The 1978 Interna-
tional Banking Act allowedforeign banksto open Edge Actcorpora-
tionswhich acceptdeposits and make loans directly relatedto inter-
national transactions.
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The Establishment ofIBFs
‘Fhree regulatory orlegislative changes have permit-
ted or encouraged the establishment and growth of
lBFs. First, the Federal Reserve Board changed its reg-
ulations in 1981 to permit the establishment of IBFs,
Second, federal legislation enacted in late 1981 ex-
empted IBFs from the insurance coverage and assess-
ments imposed by theFDIC. Third, several states have
granted special tax status to the operating profits from
tBFs or altered other restrictions to encourage their
establishment. In at least one case, Florida, tBFs are
entirely exempt from local taxes.
Restrictions on IBF Activities
While IBFs may transact banking business with U.S.
nonresidents on more or less the same terms as banks
located offshore, they maynot deal with U.S. residents
at all, apart ft’om their parent institution or other tBl”s.
Funds borrowed by a parent fi’om its own tBF ate
subject to eurocurrency reserve requirements just as
funds borrowed from an offshore branch would be.
Four other restrictions on tBFs are designed to en-
sure their separation from domestic money markets,
First, the initial maturity of deposits taken frotn non—
bank foreign customers must be at least two working
days. Overnight deposits, however, may he offered to
overseas banks, other IBI”s and the parent bank. ‘l’his
restriction ensures that lBFs do not create a close
substitute for checking accounts.
Second, the minimum transaction with at) IBF’ b’ a
nonbank customer is 5100,000, except to withdraw in-
terest or close an account. This efiectively limits the
activity of IBFs to the ‘‘wholesale’ money market, in
which the customers are likely to he governments,
major corporations or other international banks.2
There is no restriction 01) thesize ofinterbank transac-
tions,
i’hird, IBF’s are not pennitted to issue negotiable
instruments, such as cei-tihcates of deposit CDsI, be-
cause such instruments would be easily marketable in
U.S. money markets, thereby breaking down the in-
tended separation between IBFs and the domestic
money market.
Finally, deposits and loans of tBFs must not be re-
lated to a nonresident customer’s activities in the
2Foreigngovernmentsaretreatedlikeoverseasbanks for purposesof
maturity and transaction size regulations.
United States.3 This regulation prevents tBFs from
competing directly with domestic credit sources for
finance related to domestic economic activity.
Where Are IBFs Located?
tBFs arechiefly located inthe niajorfinancial centers
see table It. Almost half of the nearly 500 IBFs are in
New York;California, Florida and Illinois have the bulk
of the rest. In terms ofvalue of liabilities, however, the
distribution is even more skewed. Of tBFs reporting
monthly to the Fedei-al Reserve tthose with assets or’
liabilities in excess of $300 millioni, 77 perc rit of total
liabilitieswere in New York,with California 12 percent
and Illinois (7.5 percentl a long way behind. It is nota-
ble that Florida, which has 16.3 percent of the 1111’s,
has only 2 percent of the liabilities of reporting banks.
While the distribution of lBFs primarily reflects the
preexisting locations of international banking busi-
ness, differences in tax treatment between states may
have influenced the location of IBFs marginally. I”or
example, the fact that Florida exempts lBFs from state
taxes maywell explain why it has thelargest number of
Edge Act corporation IBFs and ranks second to New
York in terms of numbers of tBFs set up by U.S.—
chartered banks.
Although Florida has the most advantageous tax
laws possible for IBF’s, it is not alone in granting then)
favorable tax status. Nine other states (New York, Cali-
foi’nia, Illinois, Connecticut, Delaware, Manila rid,
Georgia, North Carolina and Washington and the Ijis-
trict of Columbia have enacted special tax laws that
encoui-age the establishment of IBIs:t
The reason for the favorable tax treatment for 1131’s ii)
states like Florida is not clear, ‘l’here is no doubt that
F’lorida has tried to encourage its development as an
international financial center,3 The benefits from en-
couragement of IBFs pci’ se, however, are hard to see.
For example, the employment gains are probably tris’-
ial. Since IBFs are merely new accounts in existing
institutions, each IBF will involve at most the employ-
ment of a handful of people. In many cases, there may
be rio extra employment.
3”TheBoard expects that, with respect to nonbank customers located
outside the United States, lBFs will accept only depositsthatsupport
the customer’s operations outside the United Statesand will extend
credit only to finance the customer’s non-U.S. operations.” See
“Announcements” (1981), p. 562,
4These provisions vary from case to case- For a summary of the
position in New York and California, see Key (1982).
iSee “Florida’s Baffling Unitary Tax” (1983).
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The assets and liabilities of IBFs on December 30,
1981, December 29, 1982, and October 20, 1983, are
recorded in table 2; as of October’ 20, 1983, over 98
percent of their liabilities were dollar—denominated.
The December 30, 1981, figures largely reflect busi-
ness switched from other’accounts either in theparent
bank or’ an offshore branch. Operations of the IBFs
themselves are reflected more clearly in the later
ligures. Consider the latest available figures in the third
column of table 2. ‘l’he most important aspects of these
figures is the proportion of business with other banks
vs. the proportion with nonbank customers. On the
asset side, about one—sixth oftotal assets are ‘‘commer-
cial and industrial loans’’ IItem Sat and one—ninIh are
loans to ‘‘foreigngovernments and official institutions’’
(Itern ScLThe r’emnainder’, over 70 percent are claims on
either other IBFs, overseasbanks oran overseas branch
of the parent hank. Claims on overseas banks (Items 3a
and 5h( are largest, while claims on other IBFs (Item 2(
and overseas oflices of the parent bank (Item U are of
broadly similar magnitude.
The liability structure is even more heavily weighted
toward banks. Only about 16 percent of the liabilities of
tBFs (as of October 26, 1983(were due to nonhanks. Of
these, one—third was due to ‘‘foreign government and
official institutions’’ (Item lOct and two—thirds were
due to ‘‘other non—U.S. addressees’’ (Item iodt. The
latter are mainly industrial and commer’cial firms.
‘l’he high proportion of both assets and liabilities of
1111’s due to other banking institutions r’einforces the
conclusion that the~’ ar’e an integr’al part of the euro-
dollar market. A high proportion of interhank business
is characteristic of ew-ocun’encv business in which
What Do IBFs Do?
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there may be several interbank transactions between
ultimate borrowers and ultimate lenders.6
An important role for interbank transactions is to
provide “swaps” that reduce either exchange risk or
interest rate risk for the parties involved. Suppose, for
example, an IBF has a deposit (liability) of $1 million
that will be withdrawn in one month, and it has made
a loan asset( to a customer of $1 million that will be
repaid in two months. There is ariskthat when the IBF
comes to borrow $1 million to cover the second month
of the loan, interest rates will have risen, and it will
incur a loss on the entire transaction. IL however, this
IBF can find abank that has the opposite timing prob-
lem (adeposit of $1 million for 2 months and aloan of
$1 million outstanding for one month(, the two banks
could arrangeaswap.The second hank would loan the
IBF $1 million in one month and get it back in two
months (with suitable interest(. The interest r’ate in-
volved will be agreed on at the beginning, so that nei-
ther bank would suffer ifinterest rates should change
in the second month.
‘these swap arrangements enable banks to match
the maturity structure of their assets and liabilities.
The existence of such swaps explains the high levels of
both borrowing and lending between IBFs and over-
seas branches of their parent bank.7
THE GROWTH OF IBFs
Chart I shows the growth oftotal IBF liabilities since
the end of 1981. Although the most rapid growth oc-
curred in the first six months of their’ operation, IBFs
have grown considerably over aperiod in which intei’-
national banking business in general has been
stagnant.8 Within two years, they have come to be a
significant part ofthe international money market. The
liabilities of IBFs as of October 1983 (other than to
parent banks) represent about 8½percent of gross
eurocurrency liabilities (as measured by Morgan
Guaranty) or about 7½percent of total international
banking liabilities (as measured by the Bank forInter-
national Settlements. This includes onshore bank
lending).
TMSee Niehans andHewson (1976) foran explanationofthe intermedi-
aryfunction of euromarkefs. The interbank marketis also discussed
in Dufey and Giddy (1978), chapter 5.
7For adiscussion of the role of swaps in foreign exchange markets,
see Chrystat (1984).
8According to 8,I.S. figures, international bank assets grew8.8 per-
centin 1982 in nominal terms. This compares with figures typically in
excess of 20 percentthroughout the 1970s. The combined assets of
overseas branches of U.S. banks declined by 0.6 percent in 1982
[see PressRelease (1983)1, though this partlyreflects the growth of
lBFs.
Os,’
Total Liabilities of IBFs
I ~ In ‘U
Where did this growth come from? Has the creation
ofIBFs generated alarge volume ofnew business orhas
business been shifted from elsewhere? The evidence is
that IBFbusiness has almost entirely been shifted from
elsewhere. Terr’ell and Mills use regi-ession analysis to
test the hypothesis that the creation of tBFs has led to
greater growth of external bank assets.°This hypoth-
esis is decisively rejected.
Some evidence concerning the origins of business
shifted to IBFs is available in Key.”’ It is convenient to
consider separately shifts from existing institutions in
the U.S. and shifts from overseas banking centers.
Shjftsfrom Banks in the United States
UpuntilJanuary 27, 1982, about $34 billion of claims
on overseas residents were shifted to IBF books from
other U.S. banking institutions. The bulk of this 1 85
percent! came from U.S. branches of foreign banks
especially Japanese and Italian. Foreign banks typical-
ly would have had ahigher proportion ofassets eligible
for shifting to IBFs, while Japanese and Italian banks
generally had not established shell branches in Carib-
bean offshore centers.
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In the same period, shifts of liabilities (due to parties
other than overseasbranches of the parent bank( fi’orn
books of parent entities were much smaller. These
amounted to about $6 billion, of which 90 per’cenl
came frombranches of foreign banks. The small shift of
liabilities relative to assets was affected by several fac-
tors: the negotiable nature of some deposits (CDs; the
existence of penalties for renegotiations befor’e matu-
rity; the delay in passing New York tax relief for’ tBFs
until Mar’ch 1981; the small proportions of short—ter’m
deposits unrelated to trade with the United States; and
the availability of accounts with similar returns vet
fewer’ restrictions as to maturity and denomination
(such as r’epurchase agreements(.
If oniy the domestic hooks of US-chartered banks
are considered, the shift to IBFs is extremely small. Key
reports a shift of$4.3 billion (through January 27, I982(
ofclaims on unrelated foreigner’s and only $0.1 billion
of liabilities to unrelated foreigners. An alternative
figure forclaims shifted to IBFs is obtainable by looking
at the change in commercial and industrial loans to
non-U.S. addressees plus loansto foreign banks (Feder-
al Reserve I3ujletin, tableA18, l’orlarge weekl~’ reporting
banks with assets of $750 million or moreL This indi-
cates a decline of $3.3 billion in the same period.
Shjftsfrom Other Offshore Centers
Whereas foreign banks were mainly responsible for
shifts to IBFs from banks located in the United States,
banks chartered in the United States were mainly re-
sponsible for shifts of business from offshore centers
and other over’seas banking locations. Key estimates
that U.S-chartered banks shifted about £25 billion in
claims on unrelated foreigners and about SB billion in
liabilities due to unrelated foreigners (through January
27, 1982( to IBFs fr’om overseasbranches. The compara-
ble figures for foreign banks were 85½billion and 59
billion, respectively.
‘this difference in the propensity to shift assets to
IBFs is probably explained In’the differ’entialtax incen-
tives of U.S. and foreign banks. U.S. banks pay taxes on
worldwide income and may benefit from tax advan-
tages of IBFs. Foreign banks may increase their tax
liability to the United States by establishing an 11W
instead of operating in an offshore center.
The bulk of business shifted by U.S. banks from their
overseas branches has come from the Bahamas and
Cayman Islands icollectively called Caribbean!. In the
first two months of operation ofIBFs (il/30/81—1/29/82(,
liabilities to unrelated foreigners of branches of U.S.
banks located there fell by $6.8 billion, while claims on
unrelated foreigners fell In’ $23.3 billion. Much of this
shift reflected the redundancy of shell branches, at
least foi business with non-U.S. residents, once IBFs
were permitted.
While much of the raison d’être of Caribbean
branches for business with foreigners has been re-
moved by the establishment of IBFs, these branches
continue to be important for business with U.S. resi-
dents. Terr’ell and Mills r’eport that the pr’oportion of
the liabilities of Caribbean branches due to U.S. resi-
dents rose from less than half in mid-1981 to about 70
percent by the end of 1982. However, the attraction of
offshor’edeposits to U.S. residents is likely to decrease
as interest regulations on domestic U.S. banks are re-
laxed, thereby narrowing the gap between domestic
and offshore deposit rates.
based on the figures of the Bank for International
Settlements, Terr’ell and Mills estimate thatthe propor-
tion of total international banking assets and liabilities
due to U.S. banks’ oft~horebr’anches declined by 4
percent in the first year’ of IBF operation. Another 3½
percent was lost by other overseas banking center’s to
IBFs.
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF IBFs FOR
INTERNATIONAL BANKING
The pr’imary significance ofthe experience with IBF’s
is that itenables us tobetter understand the forces that
led to the gr’owth of eur’ocurrency mai-kets. In partic-
ular, the significant decline in business in Caribbean
branches follotving the creation of lIIFs suggests that
the growth ofbusiness in this area was almost entirely
intended to bypass U’S. monetary regulations. Der’eg-
ulation of domestic banking in the United States will
presumably have further effects, since much of the
remaining business in Caribbean branches of U.S.
banks is with U.S. residents.
‘I’he regulatory changes that permitted Iheestablish-
ment of JBFs were intended to ease the burden of
domestic monetary restrictions on U.S. banks in the
conduct of international banking business.~ The ex-
tent to which this aim has been achieved is probably
veiylimited. This isbecause IBFs playno role in financ-
ing either activities ofU.S. residents orthe U.S. activities
of nonresidents.
Major U.S. banks that were involved in international
finance to asignificant degree had already found ways
around U.S. banking regulations and were not re-
stricted in their ability to compete internationally. The
“Ibid., p.566.
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fact that major U.S. banks have shifted business to lBFs
fi’omoffshore centers means, ofcourse, that there must
he some benefit from having an 11W. This may result
fromn lower transaction costs, some tax advantages or
the greater attr’action, from a risk perspective, of de-
posits located in the United States. Flowever, the big-
gest gainers among U.S. banks may he medium-sized
banks that were big enough to have some international
business hut not big enough to have an offshore
branch.’2
Other major heneficiar’ies from IBFs have been the
U.S. branches and agencies of foreign banks. It is no
accident that well over halfof all lBFs have beenestab-
lished by these banks. The benefit to them ar’ises from
the high proportion of their existing business that is
IBF-eligible, that is, the portion with nonresidents. Not
the least ofthis would hetransactions with their parent
banks overseas.
CONCLUSIONS
The establishment of IBFs inthe United Statesrepre-
sents a change in the geographical pattern of interna-
tional banking. It facilitates the conduct in the United
States ofsome business that was previously conducted
offshore. It also increases the ease with which foreign
banks can operate hranches in the United States. The
creation of IBFs, however, does not seem to have in-
12(1 is true that the largest banks havethe largest IBFs. However, the
cost saving at the margin from lBFs br a bank that had, say, a
Caribbean shell operation is much smaller than for abankthat had
no offshore booking location.
cr’eased the total volume ofinternational banking busi-
ness. Indeed, lllFs have gr’o~in at atime when interna-
tional banking growth has been at its slowest for over
two decades. This growth has been largely at the ex-
pense of banking offices in other locations.
For’the U.S. amid world economies, however’, tIlEs are
not of great significance. There may he el’hciency gains
resulting from the relaxation of U.S. regulations that led
to the establishment of lilt’s. but such gains ar’e small,
Interest iates in wor’ld capital markets are unlikely to
have been affected. Benefits that accrue to banks lo-
cated in the United States fr’on2 their IBF’ facilities ar’e
largely offset by losses in offshore banks, though in
many casesthe gainer’sand losers ar’eboth branches of
the same parent bank.
REFERENCES
“Announcements.”FederalReserveBulletin (July1981),pp. 561—63.
Chrystal, K. Alec. “A Guide to Foreign Exchange Markets,” this
Review (March 1984), pp. 5—la,
Oufey, G., and Ian H. Giddy. The International Money Market
(Prentice-Hall, 1978).
“Florida’s Baffling Unitary Tax: What Is It, Whom Does It Hurt?”
American Banker, December 28, 1983.
Key, Sydney J. “International Banking Facilities,” Federal Reserve
Bulletin (October 1982), pp. 565—77.
Niehans, Jürg, and John Hewson. “The Euro-dollar Market and
Monetary Theory,” Journal ofMoney, Credit and Banking (Febru-
ary 1976). pp. 1—27.
Press Release, Federal Reserve Board of Governors, August 22,
1983.
Terreml, Henry S., and Rodney H. Mills, International BankingFacili-
ties and the Eurodoilar Market, Staff Studies No, 1 26 (Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, August 1983).
11